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ABSTRACT 
This report describes a study of risk based inspection conducted on Gas 
Processing Plant focusing only on relief valves. The main purpose of this study is to 
fmd out whether risk based inspection is actually beneficial for conducting an 
inspection especially in terms of cost savings and risk management. The risk based 
inspection is a method of delivering and identifying highly risk equipment by 
calculating each risk level by means of optimizing the data collection. Risk is 
defmed as a combination of probability of failure and the consequences of failure of 
equipment. The major findings of this study are the determination of risk ranking of 
each equipment represented by risk matrix and the cost comparisons of inspection 
between applying RBI and not applying RBI. The result shows that RM 410000 can 
be saved if RBI methods were employed. These saving were achieved by 
systematically planning on how, where and when to inspect the relief valves. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
Risk Based Inspection (or RBI) is a risk-based approach to oil and gas industries. 
This type of inspection analyzes the possibility consequences of failure especially in 
oil and gas industries. It is also named Risk Based Integrity Management (RBIM), 
Risk Based Management (RBM), Risk Based Asset Management (RBAM) or simply 
Reliability Based Mechanical Integrity (RBMI). 
Risk Based Inspection is used to prioritize equipments that needed inspection, by 
using non-destructive testing such as hardness testing and ultrasonic testing to 
determine the equipment condition, and it is also a requirement for major oil 
refineries and chemical installations to get Department Occupational Safety and 
Health (or DOSH) approval to extend turnaround intervals. 
Equipments with high probability and high consequence of failure are given a higher 
priority for inspection than equipments with high probability of failure but have low 
consequences. This strategy allows for a rational investment of inspection resources. 
[1] 
This project will be performed in collaboration with Oil & Gas Management Sdn. 
Bhd. Initially the RBI study was to be conducted on offshore platform but after 
meting with the company Oil and Gas Management Sdn.Bhd, the project will now be 
performed instead on a gas processing plant located in the state of Johor Darul 
Ta'zim. Mainly there are two areas in the gas processing plant which involved RBI 
study on relief devices. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Traditional inspection methods are costly and inefficient because they rely on time 
based inspection governed by minimum compliance with rules, regulation and 
standards for inspection. Traditional inspection is also costly because there is no 
standard reference strategy of doing what is needed for maintaining integrity and 
improving reliability of the equipments. A more efficient method for inspection is 
needed where the probability and consequences of failure of the equipment is 
answered. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
The objective of this project is to utilize RBI approach to optimize inspection 
process and data collection to anticipate the most critical equipments on failing, 
making the cost of inspections minimize and the risk of a equipments are being 
reduce effectively. 
This project will be focused on relief valves used in a gas processing plant located in 
Johor Darul Ta'zim, Malaysia. The initial the work of the project involves retrieving 
any kind of valve data related to risk analysis process such as design and operating 
data of the valves. The data will then be analyzed using the RBMI version 7.5.7 
software provided by OGM Sdn. Bhd. A ranking level will then be produced to 
determine equipments with high risk level and equipments with low risk level. 
An inspection plan can then be recommended on how, where and when to inspect the 
relief valves. Upon finishing the project a final report will be produce to explain the 
details of the project. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
With this method, inspection labour can be reduced and probability of failure events 
occurring on the site can be diminished. The result is a safer work environment and 
fatal accidents can be put out ofsight. 
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For example, in one plant there are four hundred relief valves and for a single valve 
to be maintain takes approximate eighty to one hundred ringgit during a turnaround. 
If we used traditional time based inspection method, all the relief valves are needed 
to be replaced because they have reach five years of service. Thus approximate thirty 
two thousand ringgit is needed for the turnaround, simply for relief valve 
replacement. 
Risk based inspection method require only valves which are critically in risk to be 
replaced, which results in only one hundred valves requiring replacement. This saves 




2.1 RISK BASE» INSPECTION 
Risk Based Inspection is designed to meet the requirements of API (American 
Petroleum Institute) recommended practice 580. Risk Based Inspection is a 
systematic process for evaluating risk and factoring it into decisions ~oncerning how, 
where, and when to inspect. "Risk" is defined as measurements of probability and 
consequence of failure of certain equipment. It is also dependent on time. Therefore 
the initial element of this report is to define the terms "consequences of failure", 
''probability of failure" and "risk values" as follows. 
I. Consequence of failure 
Consequence is the outcome of an event and in RBI terms the event is normally 
defined as the loss of containment. It is the outcome of a failure event and can be 
expressed in terms of safety personnel, economic loss or damage to the 
environment. Examples of consequences of a failure event are injury of a 
individual, damage to equipment and loss of money [2]. 
2. Probability of Failure 
Failure is the loss of ability to perform the design function. In RBI we usually 
deal with failures that lead to loss of containment. The event is driven by 
material damage mechanisms, their rate of progression, and the tolerance of the 
equipment to damage, amount and type of inspection activities that have been 
performed in the past. Examples which contribute failures are internal corrosion, 
external corrosion and cracking mechanism to a equipment [2] 
3. Risk Valves 
Risk is the chance of something bad happening, where "chance" refers to a 
probability and "something" refers to a defined consequence. If values can be 
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assigned to the consequence and probability of failure then a risk value can be 
obtained from this simple equation. 
Risk= Probability of Failure X Consequence of Failure. 
Risk can be represented in the form a matrix displaying the level of likelihood 
and consequence. This method of visualizing risk is used by Oil and Gas Sdn 
Bhd. It is not the only method used in an attempt to quantify risk,· however the 
important detail is that "Risk" is a function of both the "Consequences" and the 
"Probabilities" of failure [2]. 
2.1.1 Why Do We Need RBI 
Risk Based Inspection was intmduced to the oil 1efining and petrochemical 
industries to try and reduce the amount of mechanical failures, of which the largest 
percentages were, attributed to piping systems failures. Due to sheer volume of 
piping items within a process plant the ability of RBI to identify and prioritize the 
highest risk pipes was pe1ceived to be the best way ofcombating the large amount of 
piping system. In addition to tackling the volume of mechanical failures, RBI also 
has a smaller influence on Operational Error, Process Upset, Design Error and 
Natural Hazards. This is because RBI is a management system which covers a 
variety ofdata. It is also dynamic process since risks change every day. The potential 
benefits of a reliable RBI system are: 
1. Increased plant availability due to better inspection and maintenance 
management, reducing failure events in plant site and also updating the any 
changes that occur on site by using on-line methods. 
2. Reducing risk of failure by suggesting the suitable inspection techniques for 
specific potential failure mechanism. 
3. Reducing directly inspection cost of low risk items and focusing on only 
critical equipment. Risk based inspection systems have been developed so 
that the benefits can be observed on all equipment including storage tanks, 
pressure vessel, column, heat exchanges and mechanical equipment [2]. 
2.2 RELIEF VALVE 
The relief valve is a type of valve used to control or limit the pressure in a system or 
vessel which can build up by a process upset, instrument or equipment failure, or 
fire. The pressure is relieved by allowing the pressurised fluid to flow from an 
auxiliary passage out of the system. The relief valve is designed or set to open at a 
predetermined pressure to protect pressure vessels and other equipment from being 
subjected to pressures that exceed their design limits [ 5]. 
When the pressure setting is exceeded, the relief valve becomes the "path of least 
resistance" as the valve is forced open and a portion of the fluid is diverted through 
the auxiliary route. The diverted fluid (liquid, gas or liquid-gas mixture) is usually 
routed through a piping system known as a flare header or relief header to a central, 
elevated gas flare where it is usually burned and the resulting combustion gases are 
released to the atmosphere. As the fluid is diverted, the pressure inside the vessel 
will drop. Once it reaches the valve's re-seating pressure, the valve will re-close. This 
pressure, also called blow down, is usually within several percent of the set-pressure 
[5]. 
The pressure relief system may be considered in three separate parts which are the 
pressure relief device, connection to the equipment which it protects, and the 
disposal arrangement downstream of the relief device; The most commonly used 
relief devices are safety valves (Figure 1) and bursting discs (Figure 2), either 
singly or in combination, although there are other devices that can be used in special 
circumstances. 
Meanwhile there are many types of safety valve but majority of the relief valves 
studied are conventional safety valve and bellows safety valves. The different is 
bellows type ·are longer sustain in service because its design is to prevent from the 
spring to corrode quickly. 
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Figure 1: Conventional Safety Valve [4]. 
Each of the devices has it own advantages and disadvantages in term of maintenance, 
durability and safety. It is worth remembering that not all tanks and vessels require a 
dedicated pressure relief device such as tank ope1ating at atmospheric pressure and 
vented to atmosphere [4]. 
a) Before bursting b) After bursting 
Figure 2: Bursting disc [ 4]. 
2.3 ASSESSING RISK 
Assessing the risk for the relief valves requires that the Probability and Consequence 
of Faihire to be evaluated. The Likelihood of Failure of a relief valve is has to be 
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calculated for each of the failure scenarios of interest. Mostly there are three 
common failure scenarios: 
I. Pressure bmmdary loss of containment. 
The ability to keep something harmful such as H2S gas from equipment 
protected. 
2. Valve leak-through. 
Valves that fail to reseat back causing a production loss in the overall 
operation cost. 
3. Failure-to-relieve. 
Valves that fail to relieve at the intended pressure causing a greater risk of an 
over pressure failure to the equipment protected; 
However, the failure mode of the greatest concern is failure to relieve because the 
relief valve installation purpose is to function as a layer of protection to prevent 
over-pressurization of the· system and potential failure of the equipment. Thus, this 
failure mode will affect the risk ranking integrity of the device under RBI study. 
Meanwhile to estimate the "Consequence of Failure" values, the three failure 
scenarios above will be used to estimate the loss of containment, safety, 
enviromnental, production loss and also potential failure event such as explosion. 
Most of the estimated values resemble the Consequence of Failure values of the 
equipment it protected. 
The risk level of a relief valve is then determined by taking the highest rating of both 
probability and consequence of failures values. In general, the dominant risk is due 
to failure to relief scenario where the pressure did not achieve being reduce to set 
pressure because of corrosion influences and also fouling created by the substance 
relief in the systems [6]. 
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2.4 RELIABILITY BASED MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SOFTWARE 
Reliability Based Mechanical Integrity also known as RBMl™ software is a well 
defined software for managing inspection program. Developed by Capstone for RBI 
to meet the requirements of API recommended practice 580, it manages data by 
prioritizing the equipment data to be collected and maintained. It collects less 
inspection data but provides good interpretation of data, evaluates the equipment 
conditions and makes appropriate data available with queries. 
The software also try to understand how equipment will fail by identifying the 
likelihood of failure, determining the appropriate inspection methods, confirming 
prediction with measurements, and used business rules to create a dynamic 
inspection plan. 
The software philosophy is firstly to incorporate business rules into inspection and 
maintenance planning strategies by providing consistency in optimizing maintenance 
plans and allowing the software to make recommendations. 
The approach the software nses is by taking the best available failure data and 
modifies it specifically for design, operation, and deterioration of the process. The 
software continually compares condition-mouitoring results with predictions of 
deterioration, and will reassess the predictions if result mouitoring does not agree 
with the prediction. 
2.4.1 DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS 
The general methodology of RBI is actually a life cycle inspection database which 
never stops (Figure 3). The first step of RBI process is data collection and analysis 
of the equipment study such as data from general assessment drawings, organization, 
plant unit location and system description. 
Information of the equipment such as functions and conditions should also be 
acquired. The RBI process is then continued by identifying deterioration 
mechanisms of the equipments such as creep, erosion and hot hydrogen attack. 
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Then the process continues with risk analyses where the risk ranking is determined 
based on probability of failure and probability of consequence. After the risk 
rankings are determined, the process continues by reduction of action where non 
priority equipments are inspected less frequently due to low risk than higher risk 
equipment. This step is then continued by development and execution of the 
inspection plan. Finally, repair and modification of the equipment is executed and 
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3.1 PROJECT WORK FLOW 
The projectwork flow started with the approval and endorsement of the project by 
the supervisor and also FYP coordinators. Then a concise preliminary report was 
produced to clarify the definition of the problem, the objectives of the project, and to 
define the type of tasks needed to be conducted to smoothen the process of research 
of the project. 
After deciding and planning the direction of the project, a short meeting with the 
OGM Sdn Bhd was conducted to update issues related to the project. Then the 
project continued with the data collection, process study, data upload, critical 
analyses on the relief valves, generating the inspection plans and lastly producing the 
final report. 
The following diagram (Figure4) is a simplification of the project work flow. Boxes 
which are coloured red indicate completed tasks yellow boxes indicate on going 
event while green boxes indicate current tasks. 
Currently the project has reached the final stage which is generation of the final 
report detailing the results and fmdings of cost analysis for site A and site B. This 
was then continued by determining which equipment needs to be prioritized for 
inspection and when the inspection should be executed. 
Meanwhile Table 1 on page ·15 shows the time interval for the activities needed to 
be conducted during semester two of final year report. The tasks generally involved 
data upload, risk analyses, inspection plan generation and finally dissertation writing. 
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PROJECT WORK FLOW 
Figure 4! Project work flow diagram 
3.2 RBI STEPS INVOLVED IN RELIEF VALVE 
Each device in RBI analysis has its own methodology on how to analyse the 
equipment. The differences include what data to collect, types of inspection to be 
reviewed and also strategy plans on maintenance and risk analyses. The 
methodology to conduct RBI study for relief valves device can be simplified into 
seven steps Hsted below: 
1. Data Collection, 
2. Process Data I Study, 
3. Upload data into RBMI software (version 7.5.7), 
4. Critical analysis, 
5. Generate Inspection Plans, 
6. Submission Final Report. 
The first procedure is collecting the data of the valves through existing documents 
such as general assessment drawings, inspection history reports and service reports. 
These documents will provide data such as location ID, relief valve ID, protected 
equipment types and ID, plant section, operational parameters, existence of rupture 
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disk, piping and instrumentation devices and process flow diagram series numbers, 
orientation of the device, design properties data and others. 
This is then followed by process study whereby the major part of the study is to 
determine the existence of fouling and also the corrosion rate for the internal and 
external smface of the valves. The purpose of the study is to predict what kind of 
failure mode is likely to occur on the relief valves. 
The relief valve is then checked in the field to verify the existence of the device. This 
is because they may be cases of lack of information of the device existence in the 
documents and the plant. Some of the device could have been removed or changed 
without notice. 
Basically Figure 5 shows the component of the relief valve where the most 
important task is to verify the material specification of the device and the size of the 
orifice device which is between the spring and disc. This is done by overlooking at 
its design drawings provided by the plant. This two data are important to resolve the 







Figure 5: Component in conventional relief valve 
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After data collections have been completed, the data will be uploaded for recording 
and analyzing into the RBI software provided by the company. At this stage the risk 
ranking is influenced by the probability and also consequence of failure of the 
device. This stage is the most important part of RBI analysis because it will identify 
the most critical device potential to failure and will allow us to focus on the 
particular device. 
The result of the analysis will help develop the best option to recommend of 
inspections for the valves. The option will then be reviewed by experts from OGM 
and also by the client to finalize the inspection plan. 
Finally a report will be submitted to the client to present the findings of the analyses. 
The process will start over again to reassess the risk of the device by updating the 
condition of the device since risk is also continuously dependent on time. While for 
the final report written by the author will conclude the findings of the result which is 
to find out the cost analysis using and not using risk based inspection based on cash 
flow graph predicted in the coming ten years. 
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Table 1: Gantt chart for Final Year Project 2 
No. Detail! Week 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 sw EW 
I Literature review & Upload data ;.......-; 
2 Submission of Progress Report I ~ 
3 Upload Data & Critical Analysis ~ 
= 
4 Submission of Progress Report 2 
5 Inspection planning & Dissertation 
6 Submission of Dissertation Final Draft • 
7 Oral Presentation 
8 Submission of Project Dissertation 
!(Hardbound) 
• Suggested milestone 
- Process 
c::J Project progress position 
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3.3 CRITICALITY CALCULATION FLOW 
The Figure 6 below is the basic concept of criticality calculation flow for relief 
valve to quantify the risk ranking of relief valve device. As said in the pervious page 













Deterioration ~~ Factor 
" 1 11 












E D C 8 A 
Consequence C.lfeiJOIY 
Consequence 
Figure 6: Criticality calculation flow [7]. 
Corrosion potential studies the expected corrosion rate assigned to the equipment 
item that the relief device is protecting. The corrosion potential will increase if the 
relief device relieve to atmosphere because moisture can enter the valve and 
accelerate the corrosion on valves internal. 
While if the relief device is made of higher alloy metals, bellows design or rupture 
disk protected the corrosion potential will decrease in value. The corrosion potential 
is given by the corrosion experts based on the upper point 
Potential for fouling is often quite subjective to determine and basically is depend on 
expert opinion of the process and operation personnel. 
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They are four degree of fouling which are based on level of severity. For fouls to 
point of degraded capacity in less than a year is indicate as very high severity. For 
fouls to point of degraded capacity within 1- 2 years is indicate as high severity 
while fouling seen in 2 -3 years of service is indicate medium severity and for 
fouling almost never occurs is indicate low severity. 
There is also another way to assess the potential for fouling based on quantitative 
methods. This is done by measuring the internal diameter of the orifice after the 
relief device has been in service for one year. 
If there us no reduction in the diameter due to fouling, it is given a low potential 
fouling. If there us 0.1% to 5.0% of reduction in the diameter due to fouling, it is 
given a medium potential for fouling. If there is 5.1% to 10.0% reduction in diameter 
due to fouling, it is given a medium-high potential for fouling. Lastly if there is more 
than 1 00/o reduction in diameter it is given a high potential for fouling. 
Deterioration potential stage is where the corrosion potential and fouling potential 
are being compare to one another. Whereby the highest potential stage is being uses 
for representing the condition of the device. If the two are having the same stage of 
potential and is not in low potential stage. The deterioration potential is raise to the 
next level of severity. 
"Years since last inspection" value is the recorded time of the previous inspection to 
the current inspection based on the inspection history of the device. This is needed to 
calculate the distribution of deterioration factor value. Based on the deterioration 
potential value the deterioration factor can be determined. The graph is show at the 
next page of this report (Figure 7). 
Deterioration factor is then revaluate back by determine if the relief device have a 
redundancy valve in the equipment it protected. If there is a redundancy valve on the 
equipment, the deterioration factor is divided by ten. This is because the existed of 
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This is continued by challenge rate stage where it accounts the probability of demand 
on the relief device to determine the challenge factor. The value is then multiplied 
with the deterioration factor to get the adjustable deterioration factor. 
There are two ways to asses the challenge factor frrstly by calculating the ratio of 
operating/ design pressure or estimates from the process engineer. The guideline 
table for process engineer estimating the rate is given below. 
Table 2: Usage of relief valve interest [7]. 
Frequency of Challenge Challenge Factor 
More than once every 6 months 3 
Once every 6 months to 2 years 1 
Once very 2 to 5 years 0.7 
Once every 5 to 1 0 years 0.5 
Less than once every 10 years 0.3 
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Another way to determine the challenge factor is to calculate the ration of pressure 
between the operating and also the design pressure as stated in the table below. 
Table 3: Ratio of relief valve pressure [7]. 
Ratio of Operating to Design Pressures Challenge Factor 
Greater than 0.90 3 
0.75 to 0.89 1 
0.50to 0.74 0.7 
Less than 0.50 0.3 
Where by after verify the challenge factor it is then multiplied with the deterioration 
factor to determine the finalize value of the deterioration factor. The value is the 
used to determine the probability category of the device. 
The table below shows the finalize deterioration factor determines the probability 
category of the device. 
Table 4: Probability Category based on the Finalize Deterioration Factor [7]. 







RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Basically in this chapter the results were categorised based on the six step 
methodology applied to conduct the analysis. The result of each section will be 
explained one by one starting from data collection until cost analysis. 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION RESULTS 
1. Plant and Equipment Information 
The site of the project is conducted on gas processing plants which utilize some 
of the hydrocarbon groups to process another type of product. The site can be 
divided into four sections but only two areas were involved in RBI analyses. Due 
to confidential reasons the areas are rename as site A and site B. 
In general there are 350 relief valves under going the RBI study where all the 
valves are spring loaded valve type but can be group into conventional design 
type or bellows design type. 
The results of data collection stage are shown in the following pages. The types 
of data being retrieved can be divided into two groups which are data required in 
the RBI study and supplementary data not required for the RBI analysis. Some 
confidential information are listed with alphabets. 
2. Types of data collected 
The results ofRBI-related data collected are been listed below: 
1. Location id. 
2. Device id. 
3. Protected equipment id. 
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4. Component type. 
5. Plant section. 
6. Operating unit. 
7. Existence of rupture disk. 
8. Rupture disk id. 
9. Existence of redundant relief device. 
10. Potential for fouling. 
11. Direction of relief device. 
12. Design type. 
The results of supplementary data collected are been listed below: 
1. Allowable over-pressure 
2. Orientation of the device 
3. Differential set pressure 
4. Manufacturer 
5. Relief set pressure and temperature 
6. Construction code 
7. Inlet size 
8. Outlet size 
9. Orifice size 
10. Series number ofP&ID files. 
The process then continued by gathering the visual and parts inspection service 
report data for the relief valve and key in the data into Microsoft Excel template. 
The author's role is to arrange the data according to the relief device ID, notify 
missing data, and also update any missing data. 
The author have divided the data gathering done into four sections where each 
section was conducted in a weeks time and involved an average of forty new data 
entry send by the company to the author each week. These sections started 
during week nine and ended week twelve based on the Gannt chart for the Final 
Year Project 1last semester. The data was compiled in Microsoft Excel and was 
send through the email between the author and the company supervisor. The 
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reason it was compiled in Microsoft Excel was to make it easy to upload the data 
into the RBMI software version 7.5.7 and to minimize the mistakes done by 
human error. Such partial of data are been listed in the Table 6 on page 24. 
4.3 PROCESS STUDY RESULTS 
The results for process study are to determine the corrosion potential and also 
fouling potential of each relief valve studied. 
1. Corrosion Potential 
Basically the result of corrosion potential can be verified by determining the 
material specifications of the device studied based on the data collection. By 
knowing the material specifications, one can determine the average corrosion 
rate per year by using the material average corrosion rate table provided by the 
Capstone research. From the author's observation, the common types of material 
used on relief valves are carbon steel and stainless steel, thus the average 
corrosion rate of this material are be given below. 
Table 5: Average corrosion rate per year [2]. 
Material Specification 
Average corrosion rate 
per year (mrn/year) 
Carbon steel 0.05 mrn/year 
Stainless steel O.o2 mrn/year 
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2. Fouling potential. 
Potential for fouling is often quite subjective to determine and basically it 
depends on expert's opinions of the process. Essentially there are two ways on 
determining this potential which are by finding out the fouling history device or 
by quantitative measurement through measuring the orifice size reduction after 
one year of service. Basically the project uses the first method by acquiring the 
inspection and service history of the device during data collection which tells the 
fouling potential. The average of fouling potential for the relief valves studied 
are in medium fouling category. 
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Table 6: Partial of the completed data collection 
LocationiD DeviceiD AllowOverPress BackPress ConstCode DesitmTvoe DeviceModeiNo DeviceSerNo DevManuf 
PSV-07 120752 10 API Bellows A 124752 A 
PSV-47 120753 20 API Bellows A 124753 A 
PSV-01 120655 20 API Conventional B 124655 A 
PSV-04 120656 10 API Bellows c 124656 A 
PSV-05 120657 10 API Bellows D 124657 A 
PSV-69-0 120658 A 10 API Bellows E 124658 A A 
PSV-69-1 120658 B 10 API Bellows E 124658 B A 
DevServDate P&ID Protected Eau ioment. MaxBackPress Orientation OrificeSize OutletSize ReliefSetPress ReliefTemo 
27-Mar-96 D-21-1225-801 v 157 Vertical 47.784 150 637 38 
5-Jul-93 D-21-1225-872 v 49 Vertical 2.433 50 343 115 
8-Mar-06 D-21-1225-001 ES 69 Vertical 0.882 50 2138 195 
8-Mar-06 D-21-1225-002 ES 167 Vertical 119.403 250 1079 86 
8-Mar-06 D-21-1225-002 ES 382 Vertical 9.621 80 1079 93.3 
9-Mar-06 D-21-1225-109 ES 45 Vertical 119.403 200 343 401 
9-Mar-06 D-21-1225-109 ES 45 Vertical 119.403 200 343 401 
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4.4 UPLOAD DATA 
During the semester break, the author went to the associate company OGM Sdn. 
Bhd. to conduct the critical analyses for the relief valve. Thus the next stage was to 
upload the data into the RBMI software which took around three weeks to finish. 
There were 269 valves in site A and 81 valves in site B. The following on Table 7 
are the details of the task preformed. Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 10 are partial 
screen image of the RBMI1M software. The example of how the data was uploaded 
are shown in Figure 8 while Figure 9 is where the data was been analysed and 
Figure 10 is where the data is being implemented. 
Table 7: List of eqnipments perform uploading data on software 
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4.5 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS RESULT 
Unit 
Total 
Table 8: Distribution of Criticality Ratings 
As shown above, none of the relief devices were in the "HIGH'' criticality 
category. The number of relief devices in "MEDIUM HIGH" category is 60 
relief devices where 45 of them is from site A and 15 were from site B. 
The criticality rankings were calculated in order to provide required information 
for the baseline inspection planning. They were derived from the results of the 
process/ corrosion information, previous plant inspection history and basic data 
gathered. Based on the results of this study, inspection work plans have been 
developed for the unit to provide guidance to inspection and maintenance to 
ensure the current criticality ratings are maintained or lowered. Without further 
inspection and maintenance, the equipment criticality ratings could be expected 
to increase, assuming process conditions remain constant. Through the 
implementation of the RBMI program, the criticality rating of each relief device 
in the study can be kept within the acceptable limit. 
Figure 11 shows the Criticality Distribution for all of the relief devices in the 
study. The criticality rating considers both the probability and consequence of 
failure categories both plants. 
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Risk Distribution (Site A) Risk Distribution (Site B) 
Totals Totals 
1 0 1 
16 2 .. 1 2 
29 3 I 10 3 
223 4 95 • 70 4 
0 5 0 0 0 5 
E D c B A E D c B A 
269 64 17 49 100 39 Totals 81 12 1 15 45 8 Totals 
Figure 11: Criticality Distribution for all of the relief devices 
30 
4.5.1 Consequence of Failure 
Risk assessment is based on the defining a failure scenario. The scenario 
should describe the causes and consequences of each identified failure. 
Typically, defining the Consequence of the Failure involves using an event 
tree that could lead to different end events. Each end event has a certain 
probability of occurring. It is important to develop credible failure scenarios 
for each identified failure mechanism. 
Since Consequence Analysis constitutes half of the risk equation, it is 
reasonable to expect that an effort similar to that used to define Probability of 
Failure should be applied to detennining Consequence of Failure. Flammable 
event, toxic releases, environmental risk, business interruption and asset 
repair and maintenance costs are such example for Consequence of Failure. 
For the Consequence of Failure, "A" is categorized as a Catastrophic and "E" 
as Minor. 
The Consequence of Failure Distribution for site A and B relief devices are 
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4.6 CONVENTIONAL INSPECTION VERSUS RISK BASED INSPECTION. 
Basically conventional relief device are based on visual inspection with intrusive 
inspections. Based on the Rule 467 Pressure Relief Devices the inspection 
requirements needed to be conducted are: 
1. Visually inspect each PRV on each working day. 
2. Inspect each pressure relief device handling volatile orgaruc compounds 
quarterly with a portable hydrocarbon detection instrument, except that after 
four quarterly inspections in which no leakage is detected the inspection 
frequency shall be annually. 
3. Where both a rupture disc and relief device are used in series, the downstream 
device shall be inspected. 
4. When a pressure relief device is know to have relieved, such device shall be 
subjected to an additional inspection with a portable hydrocarbon detection 
instrument within 15 working days of the date of the known pressure relief. 
5. Inspect each pressure relief device removed from service for repair within 15 
working days of the device's return to the service. 
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6. Pressure relief devices which are found to be leaking and which are tagged or 
logged for repair at the turnaround need not be inspected before the turnaround. 
Meanwhile there are three basic methods to test the relief valve during inspection 
which are Set Pressure Test, Back Pressure Test and Seat Leakage Test [8]. Those 
tests are explained in the Appendix. While the comparison between the two types of 
inspection are explained below based on the cost analysis. 
4.6.1 Cost Analysis. 
Cost analysis is based on the criticality result of the equipment. It also compares the 
cost using conventional inspection which uses time based and cost using RBI 
method. Assuming the inspection cost for a relief valve is approximately RMI 000.00 
per devices, the total cost for the inspection method can be determined. The cost 
value is based on the estimate from OGM Sdn Bhd. The cost analysis are shown in 
Table 8 and Table 9 and also shown graphically in Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
Table 9: Distribution of equipment inspection for site A 
RBI method for site A: 
Time to be 
1 3 5 10 
inspected (Years) 
No. of equipment 
inspect 0 45 269 538 
Conventional method for site A: 
Time to be 
1 3 6 9 
inspected (Years) 
No. of equipment 
inspect 0 269 538 807 
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Cash Flow for Site A 
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Figure 14: Cost Analysis for site A. 
Basically there is a large difference using RBI method and conventional method to 
maintain the relief valve. From the graph, the difference basically started from third 
year and continued afterwards. Around RM 224000 will be saved during the third 
year if the RBI method is being applied while around RM 317000 will be saved on 
the ninth year if this method continued. 
Table 10: Distribution of equipment inspection for site B 
RBI method for site B: 
Time to be 
1 3 5 10 
inspected (Years) 
No. of equipment 
inspect 0 15 81 162 
Conventional method for site B: 
Time to be 
1 3 6 9 
inspected (Years) 
No. of equipment 
inspect 0 81 162 243 
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Cash Flow for Site B 
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Figure 15: Cost Analysis for site B. 
From the cost analysis graph for site B, there is also a big difference starting from 
third year and continued afterwards. Around RM 66000 will be save during the third 
year if the RBI method is being applied and if this continues then the cost to 
maintain the relief valve will be save around RM93000. 
4.7 RISK SUMMARY FOR FINAL REPORT. 
The risk summary listed in the Appendix shows the probability of failure categories, 
consequence of failure category and inspection priorities for all the relief devices 
included in the scope of work for site A and site B. 
4.7.1 Inspection Work Plan Summary for Final Report. 
Inspection plans were generated for all relief devices in the study and are based on 
the LR Capstone inspection planning rules. Each plan includes the relief devices 
Inspection Priority Ranking, the extent or inspection coverage and the inspection 
frequency. The Inspection Priority Matrix in Figure 15 defines where each 
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Inspection Priority Ranking falls within the matrix. The Inspection Priority Ranking 
is a combination of the consequence of failure and probability of failure. 
Inspection Priority Matrix 





E 0 c 8 A 
Figure 16: Inspection Priority Matrix. 
The inspection interval was set to the shorter of the following intervals: 
1. The inspection interval established by the Criticality Rating on the date of the 
criticality runs: 
};> Low: 5 years 
};> Medium: 5 years 
};> Medium High: 3 years 
};> High: 1 year 
2. Time required for the relief device to increase two levels of criticality or 





The main objective of this project is to compare the cost of inspection using risk 
based inspection to conventional inspection on relief valves. These findings were 
then plotted in a cash flow graph diagram to compare which inspection method is 
better. Basically the findings of the results not only reduce the cost of inspecting and 
maintenance of the equipment but also at the same time reduce the cumulative risk 
of the plant. The cuinulative cash fmdings expected to be saved from site A and site 
B after nine years are to reach about RM 410000 when using risk based inspection 
method. The technique is done by parametering only highly risk relief valves, 
focusing on the equipments and put effort more into when to inspect or to maintain 
the equipment. All of this is done by optimizing the data collection, uploading the 
data via software and analyzing the risk by producing the risk matrix. The results 
then will indicated on how, where and when to inspect and maintain the equipment. 
The final objective of this project is achieved by executing the plan generated based 
ort the scope given in the project. The report support the hypothesis where risk based 
inspection is a better inspection method than conventional inspection. 
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Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plant LocatloniD DevlceiD 
Protected by Rupture Probability Consequence 
Criticality Ratina 
Inspection 
Last lnsp one Rupture Disc DlsldD catqory cateaory Priority 
Site A NG-101 NG-101 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 12/09/1995 
Site A NG-102 NG-102 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 13/12/2004 I 
Site A PSV-0007 124752 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 08/03/2006 
Site A PSV-0029 322068 N 3 c MEDIUM 14 29/07/1997 I 
J 
Site A PSV-0047 124753 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 08/03/2006 I 
Site A PSV-0101 124655 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 08/03/2006 
Site A PSV-0204 124656 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 08/03/2006 
Site A PSV-0205 124657 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 08/03/2006 
Site A PSV-0210A PSV-0210A N 3 c MEDIUM 14 01/03/1994 
Site A PSV-02108 PSV-02108 N 3 c MEDIUM 14 01/03/1994 
Site A PSV...0210C PSV-0210C N 3 c MEDIUM 14 01/03/1994 
Site A PSV-1 PSV-1 N 4 D 21 11/02/1999 
Site A PSV-1369-0 124658 A N 3 c MEDIUM 14 09/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1369-1 124658 8 N 3 c MEDIUM 14 09/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1369-2 124658 c N 3 c MEDIUM 14 10/03/2006 
Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plant LocatloniD DevlceiD Protected by Rupture Probability Consequence Crltl~llty Ratlna Inspection Last lnsp O.te Rupture Disc DlskiD Catqory Catqory Priority 
Site A PSV-1369-3 124659 D N 3 c MEDIUM 14 10/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1370-0 124659 A N 3 c MEDIUM 14 09/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1370-1 124659 B N 3 c MEDIUM 14 10/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1370-2 124659 c N 3 c MEDIUM 14 09/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1370-3 124658 D N 3 c MEDIUM 14 10/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1401-0 124660 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 07/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1401-1 124661 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 26/07/2006 
Site A PSV-1401-2 124662 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 07/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1401-3 124663 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 07/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1402-0 124827 A N 4 c MEDIUM 18 07/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1402-1 124827 B N 4 c MEDIUM 18 26/07/2006 
Site A PSV-1402-2 124827 c N 4 c MEDIUM 18 07/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1402-3 124827 D N 4 c MEDIUM 18 19/10/2004 
Site A PSV-1403-0 124828 A N 4 c MEDIUM 18 07/03/2006 
Site A PSV-1403-1 61389 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 25/07/2006 
Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plant I LocatloniD I DevlceiD I Protected by Probability Consequence Criticality Rattna Inspection Last lnsp Date 
Rupture Disc catqory cateaorv Priority 
SiteA I PSV-1403-2 I 124828 c I N I I 4 I c I MEDIUM I 18 07/03/2006 
Site A I PSV-1403-3 I 124628 B I N I I 4 I c I MEDIUM I 18 I 04/10/2007 
-
Site A I PSV-1Vll I 2069201 I N I I 3 I B I MEDIUM HIGH I 9 I 11/01/2001 
Site A I PSV-2 I PSV-2 I N I I 4 I D 21 I 11/02/1999 
Site A I PSV-2305A I 224832 I N I I 4 I B I MEDIUM I 15 I 09/03/2006 
Site A I PSV-23058 I 224826 I N I I 4 I B I MEDIUM I 15 I 09/03/2006 
Site A I PSV-2305C I 124665 I N I I 4 I B I MEDIUM I 15 I 09/03/2006 
SiteA I PSV-2320A I 124666 A I N I I 4 I E 23 I 07/03/2006 
-
SiteA I PSV-2320S I 124666 B I N I I 4 I E 23 I 07/03/2006 
SiteA I PSV-2321A I 124667 A I N I I 4 I E 23 I 08/03/2006 
SlteA I PSV-23215 I 329625 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 06/ 03/2006 
SiteA I PSV-2605 I 329628 I N I I 2 I D I MEDIUM I 13 I 08/01/2001 
SiteA I PSV-2606 I 124669 I N I I 4 I B I MEDIUM I 15 I 03/07/2007 
SiteA I PSV-2607 I 124668 B I N I I 2 I D I MEDIUM I 13 I 08/01/2001 
SiteA I PSV-2608 I 124668 I N I I 2 I D I MEDIUM I 13 I 05/01/2001 
Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plant I LocatfoniD I DevtceiD I Protectedby Rupture Probability Consequence Criticality RM~na Inspection Last tnsp Date Rupture Disc DlskiD cateaory catqory Priority 
SiteA I PSV-2V11 I 2069202 I N 3 8 9 04/01/2001 
SiteA I PSV-3115 I 124670 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 02/02/2006 
-
SiteA I PSV-3118A I 224833 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 25/01/2006 
Site A I PSV-31188 I 224828 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 26/01/2006 
SiteA I PSV-3118C I 329610 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 27/01/2006 
SiteA I PSV-3123A I 224834 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 06/02/2006 
SiteA I PSV-31238 I 224830 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 07/02/2006 
Site A I PSV-3200A I 122363 I N I I 4 I D 21 I 06/03/2006 
-
Site A I PSV-32008 I 122356 A I N I I 4 I D 21 I 06/03/2006 
SiteA I PSV-32005 I 122356 8 I N I I 4 I D 21 I 06/03/2006 
SlteA I PSV-32015 I LE1124 I N I I 4 I D 21 I 13/03/2006 
SlteA I PSV-3212 I 124673 I N I I 3 I 8 9 I 18/01/2001 
SiteA I PSV-3213 I 124674 I N I I 4 I D 21 I 07/03/2006 
SiteA I PSV-3215 I 124675 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 03/02/2006 
SiteA I PSV-3315 I 124676 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 08/03/2006 
Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plant LocatfoniD DeviceiD 
Protected by Rupture Probability Consequence 
Criticality Ratlftl 
Inspection Last lnsp Date 
Rupture Disc DlskiD CateJory catetorv Priority 
Site B PSV-9803 124803 N 3 B 9 01/06/1994 
I 
Site B PSV-9804 PSV-9804 N 3 B 9 19/09/1995 
I 
Site B PSV-9805 PSV-9802 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 17/02/2005 I 
Site B PSV-9806 124804 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 10/06/1998 
Site B PSV-9807 124805 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 10/07/1998 
Site B PSV-9861 124810 N 3 c MEDIUM 14 25/01/1995 
Site B RV-007 91FY045 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site B RV-029 91FY046 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site B RV-047 91FY047-1 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 20/01/1999 
Site B RV-1038 91FY047-2 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site 8 RV-104 91FY019 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 07/02/1999 
Site B RV-105 91FY049 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 07/02/1999 
Site B RV-106A 91FYOS0-1 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site B RV-1068 91FYOS0-2 N 4 B MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site B RV-106C 91FY050-3 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plent LocetioniD DeviceiD 
Protected by Rupture Probeblllty Consequence 
CrttJcaUty ~ Inspection Lest lnsp Dete Rupture Disc DlskiD c.tecorv Cetelorv Priority 
Site 8 RV-201 90FX331 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site 8 RV-202 90FX332 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site 8 RV-203 90FX333-1 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 29/01/2005 
Site 8 RV-1101 90FX334 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 29/01/2005 
Site 8 RV-1204 90FX335 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 29/01/2005 
Site 8 RV-1205 90FX336 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 30/01/1999 
Site 8 SV-051 C88079 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 11/10/2004 
Site 8 SV-052 C88080 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 11/10/2004 
Site 8 SV-101A 125218A N 4 A 10 01/06/1994 
Site 8 SV-1018 1252188 N 4 A 10 01/06/1994 
Site 8 SV-102 91FY051 N 4 A 10 28/01/1999 
I 
Site 8 SV-103 91FY052 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 21/03/2005 
-
Site 8 SV-104 92FX135 N 4 8 MEDIUM 15 29/01/1999 
Site 8 SV-171A SV-171A N 4 c MEDIUM 18 07/02/1999 
Site 8 SV-1718 SV-1718 N 4 c MEDIUM 18 08/02/1999 
Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plant I LocatloniD I DevlceiD I Protected by I Rupture I ProbabHity Consequence Criticality Ratlftl Inspection LastlnspDate Rupture Disc DlskiD C.tqory Catqory Priority 
Site 8 I SV-172A I SV-172A I N I I 4 8 MEDIUM 15 07/02/2008 
Site 8 I SV-1728 I SV-1728 I N I I 3 I 8 9 I 08/02/1999 
-
Site 8 I SV-181 I SV-181 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 24/03/2005 
Site 8 I SV-183 I SV-183 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 22/03/2005 
Site 8 I SV-184 I SV-184 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 24/03/2005 
Site 8 I SV-185A I SV-185A I N I I 4 I E 23 I 07/02/1999 
Site 8 I SV-1858 I SV-1858 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 21/03/2005 
Site 8 I SV-187 I 111209 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 22/03/ 2005 
-
Site 8 I SV-188 I 91FY053 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 22/03/ 2005 
Site 8 I SV-201A I 025064A I N I I 4 I A 10 I 01/06/1994 
Site 8 I SV-2018 I 0250648 I N I I 4 I A 10 I 01/06/1994 
Site 8 I SV-202 I 90FX328 I N I I 4 I B I MEDIUM I 15 I 29/01/2005 
Site 8 I SV-203 I 90FX329 I N I I 4 I A 10 I 01/02/2005 
Site B I SV-204 I 90FX330 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 22/04/2005 
Site 8 I SV-271A I SV-271A I N I I 4 I c I MEDIUM I 18 I 29/ 01/ 2005 
Risk Based Inspection Study on Gas Processing Plant 
Plant I LocatloniD I DevlceiD I Protected bv Probability Consequence Criticality Ratinl Inspection Ulst lnsp Date Rupture Disc catetorv cateaorv Priority 
Site 8 I SV-2718 I SV-2718 I N I I 4 I c I MEDIUM I 18 02/02/1999 
Site 8 I SV-272A I SV-272A I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 29/01/2005 
Site 8 I SV-2728 I SV-2728 I N I I 4 I 8 I MEDIUM I 15 I 02/02/2005 
Site 8 I SV-401A I 91F7564-2 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 29/01/2005 
Site 8 I SV-4018 I 91F7564-1 I N I I 4 I E 23 I 02/02/2005 
Site 8 I SV-402A I 91FY054 I N I I 2 I E I MEDIUM I 16 I 01/06/1994 
Site 8 I SV-4028 I SV-4028 I N I I 3 I E 20 I 01/06/1994 
